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BOOK REVIEWS 383 
here and now (331), and a hypotopia 
is the opposite, a de-generate form of 
dystopia, that is, a degraded place that 
exhibits all the shortcomings of human 
places. "Here at the interface between 
desirable places and undesirable ones 
is the locus of social formation, mean-
ing and structure" (332). With refer-
ence to three different types of 
spaces-the Paris Latin Quarter, 
Sartre's No Exit, and a painting by Pin-
turicchio-Silverman shows how these 
heterotopian discourses can be 
analyzed in their relation to "utopian 
pro-jections or dystopian de-jections" 
(337). In all these cases, the deconstruc-
tion of this interpretive topology not 
only opens up the understanding of 
these spaces, but also deconstructs the 
hypertopian/hypotopian opposition in 
order to make explicit, says Silverman, 
"the text of human spatial experience 
[which] is situated at the juncture be-
tween the two" (334). 
The possibility of an archeology of 
heterotopias leads directly to Silver-
man's last and perhaps most crucial 
task: a hermeneutic semiology of the 
self whose task will be "to establish a 
direct correlation between the self as 
interpreter and the system of signs pro-
duced in the interpretation" (338). It is 
in this gathering of the "how" of her-
meneutic interpretation and of the 
"what" of semiological analysis that 
the self is formed . This is because signs 
are signs of an interpretive act, signs 
of a presence and of an actualization 
of the self's sign system which can only 
be recovered through interpretation it-
self (345). 
As Silverman points out in the Intro-
duction, Inscriptions "is not a philo-
sophical treatise. " This qualification 
announces the distancing that distin-
guishes it from a traditional philosoph-
ical investigation . Inscriptions prescribes 
neither a new centering for philosophy 
nor proliferates older ones . Rather, it 
seeks to inscribe the space at which 
philosophies intersect by defining their 
terms and their boundaries. Inscriptions 
is at the same time an archeology of 
knowledge, a theory of typology, a her-
meneutic semiology or, simply, a 
theory of textuality. In other words, it 
is an important work that creates the 
possibility for new areas of analysis 
and requires close scrutiny from all 
those who today engage in the practice 
of theoretical understanding. 
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There is a tradition in political and 
social theory which consists in large 
measure of the study of the origin and 
consequences of the following fact-
every politically organized society is di-
vided into two classes: a minority of 
rulers, and a majority of subjects ruled 
by them. It is often labeled the elite or 
elitist school, although the term elitism 
is misleading by conveying an anti-
democratic connotation which is not 
necessarily part of the theory; further, 
we do not really have a "school" in the 
full-blown sense that sociologists of 
knowledge deal with. An example of 
an important issue discussed by elite 
theorists is the question of whether and 
how this class division exists in a demo-
cratic society, how elitism conceives 
the difference between democratic and 
undemocratic societies, what is the na-
ture and origin of these ruling and elite 
classes, whether there is any way in 
which this class division could ever be 
eliminated, and what is the relation-
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ship between elitism and Marxism 
(which also stresses class division). 
The originator of this type of theory 
is Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), best 
known as the author of Elementi di sci-
enza politica, which was translated into 
English as The Ruling Class. It should 
also be noted that, for most of his life, 
Mosca was a university professor (at 
such places as Turin, Milan, and Rome) 
and a government official (including 
senator for the last twenty years of his 
life). The elite school seems to have 
flourished in Italy more than elsewhere, 
the best known of these authors being 
Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels. 
However, important contributions 
have been made by many others, for 
example Austrian Joseph Schumpeter 
(1883-1950) with Capitalism, Socialism, 
and Democracy (1942), American C. 
Wright Mills with The Power Elite (1956), 
and Englishman Thomas B. Bottomore, 
who is the author of Elites and Societies 
(1964) and of a brief Foreword to the 
book under review. 
Mosca and the Theory of Elitism is a 
useful and valuable introduction to the 
history and theory of elitism. Two-
thirds of it deals, appropriately, with 
Mosca's life and thought and relevant 
historical events in Italy; the rest dis-
cusses other important theorists, as 
well as the current status of Mosca 
scholarship. The work is generally clear, 
well organized, and well documented. 
It is also relatively self-contained in the 
sense that it presupposes very little in 
the way of technicalities; at the same 
time it exposes the reader to many of the 
latest issues in the scholarly literature. 
The volume is mostly a translation of 
the author's Italian book Dottrina della 
classe politica e teoria delle elites (1985), 
but it is not merely a translation since 
new material has been added for the 
English-language edition. Albertoni is 
a distinguished scholar who teaches at 
the University of Milan and has au-
thored several other books on Mosca 
in Italian. Given the socio-political im-
portance of the issues and the recent 
growth of scholarly interest in Mosca 
and elitism in Italy and elsewhere, this 
translation is highly welcome. 
Albertoni' s account of Mosca focuses 
on his doctrine of the political class, 
his attitude toward parliamentarism 
and democracy, the interplay between 
the scientific and the ideological com-
ponents of his thought, and the connec-
tion between his thought and Italian 
historical conditions. As already men-
tioned, these discussions are useful 
and valuable, but there is no sustained 
discussion of Mosca' s method of think-
ing or the approach he follows in his 
inquiries, aside from a few scattered 
remarks about positivism, realism, and 
his Machiavellian, empirical, and his-
torical approach. Such methodological 
understanding (as we may call it) is 
always important in the study of a great 
thinker since it enables us to learn and 
appreciate important lessons, even 
while disagreeing about specific sub-
stantive details. Moreover, in the con-
text of the present work, the analysis 
of Mosca's method or approach would 
have been even more valuable because 
it would have enabled us to understand 
better the similarities and differences 
among the various "elitist" thinkers. 
Another comment I would make in-
volves Albertoni' s view of Gramsci, es-
pecially his failure to appreciate that the 
author of the Prison Notebooks belongs 
in an important sense to the tradition 
of elitism. Of course, this is a complex 
and controversial matter, and Alber-
toni is merely following the traditional 
interpretation of Gramsci as belonging 
to the opposite tradition of Marxism 
and as being merely an uncom-
prehending and negative critic of 
Mosca (35-37). There is no space here 
to elaborate the point I have argued 
elsewhere that it is ironical for anti-
Marxist critics to accept uncritically 
what is ultimately the interpretation of 
Gramsci contrived by that inimitable 
Marxist who was Palmiro Togliatti. Let 
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me rather simply suggest the following 
as a working hypothesis, for I do not 
claim to have yet articulated and 
documented this interpretation: an 
analysis of the explicit discussions of 
Mosca in the Notebooks would reveal 
that Gramsci's criticism was essentially 
constructive, that he anticipated some 
common criticisms of Mosca' s doc-
trines (for example, one by no less a 
Mosca scholar than James H. Meisel, 
to whom Albertoni refers in other con-
texts), that Gramsci's theories of intel-
lectuals and of relations of force were 
carrying on the Moschian research pro-
gram, and that there are other more 
implicit parallelisms (such as the mean-
ing of the concept of "democracy" and 
the explanatory power of "elitism"). 
A final remark would be that on 
scores of occasions Albertoni uses the 
term "dialectics" and its cognates. For 
example, in regard to Mosca's early 
work, Albertoni objects that he "was 
unable to understand the dialectical re-
lationship between the classes which 
was taking shape during his formative 
years and while he was writing his first 
book" (30). And in Mosca's middle 
period, his earlier concept of political 
class "is linked dialectically to the 'new 
concept' toward which his entire re-
search is directed: that of juridical de-
fence" (51). And his late and mature 
period begins with the second edition 
(1923) of the Elementi di scienza politica, 
which contains "a new up-to-date and 
dialectical section" (85), which perhaps 
involves "dialectics in the doctrine of 
the political class-science, ideology 
and ethics" (94). Albertoni does not 
clarify the conception of dialectic he 
has in mind, and so it is natural for 
someone like myself-who has strug-
gled with the analysis of the concept-
to wish that mor e clarification had been 
provided . Nevertheless, I believe Al-
bertoni has intuited something ex-
tremely important about the mature 
































ter of his thought. The elaboration of 
this intuition would be a most instruc-
tive undertaking. 
Some of my reasons for this hunch 
connect with my earlier remarks. If the 
dialectic is conceived methodologically 
as a manner of thinking that may be 
employed in the "scientific" investiga-
tion of human affairs (which is my in-
clination, and if space allowed I would 
have mentioned the specific concep-
tual content that defines it), then such 
a dialectical interpretation would pro-
vide the answer to the first issue I 
raised, namely, what is Mosca's method 
or approach, as distinct from the specif-
ics of his doctrines. Second, since, as I 
have argued elsewhere, the dialectic 
defines the deep structure of Gram sci' s 
thought in the Notebooks, this would 
add a methodological similarity to the 
substantive one postulated above to 
exist between the two thinkers. 
In conclusion, Albertoni's work is 
useful, valuable, and welcome for the 
information and accounts it provides. 
But it is even more significant for the 
insights it indirectly suggests, and for 
the future research it challenges us to 
do, those of us who are so impertinent 
as to complain about its omissions and 
blemishes. 
MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas 
Senso e paradosso 
By Emilio Garroni 
Bari: Laterza, 1986 
The definition of "what philosophy 
is" and what kind of knowledge it 
legitimizes is a problem unresolved 
and, to a certain extent, unresolvable. 
If philosophy is just a form of literary 
discourse-as has been stated-we still 
do not know what literariness is. 
Maybe philosophy is, more properly, 
the old name given to the unlimited 
process of interpretation that charac-
terizes the human enterprise in his-
tory. In one word: it is "hermeneutics." 
We can also ask in what sense philo-
sophical knowledge is different from 
scientific knowledge. Is the task of the 
philosopher to build, with "archaeo-
logical" or "genealogical" methods, a 
"history of the ideas"? Or is the pur-
pose of philosophy to build a metalan-
guage, a "superscience" of some sort, 
able to re-elaborate the results of the 
different sciences on a higher level? 
To explore and determine what is the 
"object" of the philosophical enter-
prise is the main purpose of the most 
recent book by Emilio Garroni. In it he 
investigates the nature of philosophical 
questioning more than philosophy as a 
discipline or a type of knowledge. Gar-
roni, professor of Aesthetics at Rome 
University, in recent years has increas-
ingly concentrated his attention on au-
thors like Kant (and especially the 
Critique of Judgment), Wittgenstein, and 
Heidegger in order to understand in 
what sense answers to questions con-
cerning the foundations of the philo-
sophical enterprise are possible. And 
if the nature of "general" philosophical 
knowledge is a problem, an even big-
ger difficulty surrounds the status of 
the so-called special philosophies, 
among which Aesthetics seems to suf-
fer a paradoxically weak position. A 
close reading of its history, since the 
first "modern" use of the word by 
Baumgarten, shows that Aesthetics 
has been, since the beginning, a 
"philosophy of art dissatisfied with it-
self." The dominion of the "aesthetic" 
as an adjective is nowadays so large 
and vague that Garroni needs to begin 
his book by asking himself if, perhaps, 
Aesthetics is a philosophy "without ob-
ject," and if, in that case, it is ready to 
